


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
TRADOC FOLLOW-UP REPORT TO OBSERVATIONS NOTED DURING
JRX GALLANT KNIGHT 8. (U) ARMY COMBINED ARMS COMBAT
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


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**TRADOC FOLLOW-UP REPORT
TO OBSERVATIONS
NOTED DURING
JRX GALLANT KNIGHT 82 AND
JRX GALLANT EAGLE 82**

**PREPARED BY
EXERCISE MANAGEMENT DIVISION
UNIT TRAINING SUPPORT DIRECTORATE
COMBINED ARMS COMBAT
DEVELOPMENTS ACTIVITY**

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027
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STATUS OF OBSERVATIONS

<u>OBSERVATION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>PROPONENT</u>
GK 82-1	Closed	
GK 82-2	Closed	
GK 82-3	Closed	
GK 82-4	Closed	
GK 82-5	Open	HQ TRADOC
GK 82-6	Closed	
GK 82-7	Open	CACDA
GK 82-8	Open	CGSC
GK 82-9	Open	CACDA
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GE 82-6	Closed	
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REPLY TO
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ATZL-TDU-E

26 NOV 1982

SUBJECT: Follow-up Status - TRADOC After Action Report for JRX
GALLANT KNIGHT 82 and JRX GALLANT EAGLE 82

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Inclosed is the JRX GALLANT KNIGHT 82 and the JRX GALLANT EAGLE 82 TRADOC After Action Report with follow-up status.
2. This is one in a series of reports published by the Combined Arms Center, reflecting concerns of field commanders in regard to TRADOC products. The widest possible dissemination is made in an effort to stimulate thought on current training and doctrinal issues as well as to keep field units informed.
3. TRADOC agencies are requested to review this report for proponent assignments upon receipt. Proponents are additionally requested to notify this headquarters of their point of contact for follow-up action once their review is complete. The suspense for proponent follow-up action is 16 March 1983. While this is a TRADOC After Action Report designed to resolve doctrinal issues by the TRADOC proponents, comments from the field are encouraged but not required.
4. Points of Contact at this headquarters are LTC Ron Osimo, MAJ(P) Cliff Reed or CPT(P) Mark Spitler, Unit Training Support Directorate, CACDA, AV 552-3839/4317.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

for *Timothy J. Decker* SFC
TIMOTHY J. DECKER
MAJ, GS
ASST Adjutant General

26 NOV 1982

ATZL-TDU-E

SUBJECT: Follow-up Status - TRADOC After Action Report for JRX
GALLANT KNIGHT 82 and JRX GALLANT EAGLE 82

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FOLLOW-UP STATUS TO THE TRADOC AFTER ACTION REPORTS
FOR JRX GALLANT KNIGHT 82 AND GALLANT EAGLE 82

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SECTION I

TRADOC PARTICIPATION IN MAJOR EXERCISES BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES, AND CONCEPTS

1. References:

- a. Message, CDR, USACAC and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-CG, 261620Z Aug 80, subject: TRADOC Participation in Joint Readiness Exercises.
- b. Message, HQDA, DAMO, 151307Z Sep 80, subject: TRADOC Participation in Joint Readiness Exercises.
- c. Message, CDR TRADOC, ATTG, 191945Z Sep 80, subject: TRADOC Participation in Joint Readiness Exercises.
- d. USAREUR/FORSCOM/TRADOC Regulation 11-11, 1 May 1981.
- e. FORSCOM/TRADOC Regulation 350-20, 1 December 1981.

2. General Background: TRADOC participation in Joint Readiness Exercises (JRXs) was directed by the Chief of Staff, Army, in August 1980. CATRADA was tasked to assume proponentcy for the program management. Since its inception, TRADOC subject matter experts (SMEs) have participated in all USREDCOM JRXs and provided assistance to HQ IX Corps, USARJ, for their YAMA SAKURA exercises.

3. Program Objectives:

- a. To improve the TRADOC-FORSCOM interface as established by USAREUR/FORSCOM/TRADOC Regulation 11-11.
- b. To allow TRADOC SMEs to evaluate the existence, soundness, and application of doctrine.
- c. To assist REDCOM and FORSCOM in scenario development.
- d. To assist FORSCOM and the ARRED action agent in the development of Army objectives for each exercise.
- e. The focus of TRADOC participation is the evaluation of TRADOC products. TRADOC participants have viewed this program as an excellent means of providing support to the exercising headquarters, as well as providing insight to the doctrinal development process. Additionally, this program provides an opportunity to discuss ongoing TRADOC projects with field commanders and to solicit input for these projects.

4. Report Organization:

a. The intent of this report is the identification, follow-up, and resolution of TRADOC issues surfaced during each exercise.

b. Sections II and III of this report contain the follow-up status of observations noted during JRX GALLANT KNIGHT 82 and GALLANT EAGLE 82.

c. The term "observation" is intentionally used to enable field concerns to be informally addressed. As such, "observations" do not necessarily represent command positions, but provide a sensing of field perceptions.

d. This report has been edited to eliminate redundancy and establish proponency for actions that fall within TRADOC's area of responsibility.

5. Program Management: A management program has been developed to track issues from identification to resolution. Following each exercise, the Combined Arms Center will publish a report providing an update on observations associated with that exercise. Approximately six months later, a follow-up report will be issued which will provide an update on all unresolved observations. This will be repeated at six month intervals until all identified issues are resolved.

SECTION II

EXERCISE SUMMARY

JRX GALLANT KNIGHT 82

23 January - 2 February 1982

1. General: Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 82 was a Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinated command post exercise (CPX) sponsored by United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM). The exercise was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 23 January to 2 February 1982.

2. Purpose: Exercise the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and its components, as well as the deployment community.

3. Evaluation Areas: Within the framework of the exercise, TRADOC SMEs conducted a formal doctrinal evaluation of the following areas:

a. Command and Control, specifically focusing on an examination of Command Relationships, both internal and external to the RDJTF, and Rules of Engagement, both within and outside the Joint Operating Area (JOA).

b. Joint Operations on the Extended Battlefield, focusing on Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (JSAK).

c. Sustainability, specifically examining the validity of the RDJTF logistic concept and supporting plans.

4. TRADOC SME Support for JRX GALLANT KNIGHT 82:

USA CACDA
MAJ(P) Donald L. Mercer

Threat Controller

USA CATRADA
MAJ Cliff W. Reed
CPT(P) Mark G. Spitler

TRADOC Program Manager
Operations/Plans Evaluator (C2)

USA Command and General Staff College
LTC(P) Huba Wass de Czege

Army Operations and Plans
Evaluator (JSAK)

USA Logistics Center
LTC James R. Crockett

UW Logistics Evaluator
(Sustainability)

MAJ Franklin J. McGlynn

Army Logistics Evaluator
(Sustainability)

CPT Joseph D. Palatka

Petroleum Evaluator
(Sustainability)

<u>USA Infantry School</u> CPT James L. Holloway	Ranger Operations Evaluator (JSAK)
CPT Willie T. Womack	Operations Security Evaluator (C ²)
<u>USA Intelligence School - Ft Huachuca AZ</u> CPT Thomas M. Johnson	Intelligence Evaluator (JSAK)
<u>USA Intelligence School - Ft Devens MA</u> MAJ Kevin A. Craig	Electronic Warfare/Command Control, Communications Countermeasures Evaluator (C ²)
<u>USA Signal School</u> MAJ John R. Smith	Communications Evaluator (C ²)
<u>USA Chemical School</u> LTC William S. Thomas	Chemical Operations Evaluator (C ²)
<u>USA Institute for Military Assistance</u> MAJ Jeffrey Fletcher	Unconventional Warfare Operations/ Plans Evaluator (C ²)
MAJ George D. Shea	Unconventional Warfare Operations/ Plans Evaluator (JSAK)
<u>USA Missile and Munitions School</u> MAJ Joseph J. Field	Munitions Evaluator (Sustainability)

FOLLOW-UP STATUS OF TRADOC OBSERVATIONS

JRX GALLANT KNIGHT 82

OBSERVATION: GK 82-1

Source: USACAC

While the logic of why the deep battle must be fought is generally clear Army wide, there are no clear techniques of how to do it.

DISCUSSION: US Army procedures for the deep battle must integrate planning for maneuver, fires, electronic warfare, and intelligence collection. At present we tend to concentrate on how to get fire on the enemy beyond the FLOT. Placing the responsibility for the deep battle with the FSE tends to do that. Deep battle planning must be viewed like the planning for any other operation. At corps level it can be done on a 24 hour cyclical basis beginning with a CG, G2, G3, FSE conference on what needs to be done in the deep battle from the FLOT out to 72 hours. The current situation in the division area of influence is reviewed as well as the enemy threat further out. From this examination the commander issues his guidance. Assets are earmarked for planning by subordinate units and for deeper targets in the corps area of influence. EEI is determined from which a collection plan is developed to support the operation plan. The plan is developed by the plans section which is augmented by an FSE target planning cell. This deep battle planning team at corps HQ is headed by the G3 plans officer with G2 plans, FSE, USAF and EW composition. Their task is more than the production of a target list. They produce a comprehensive plan in FRAG order format with a mission statement, etc., which incorporates maneuver considerations, a collection plan, primary and alternate target nominations (BAI, artillery, and EW) and an overall comprehensive scheme. This plan is the basis for the tasking of systems in a synchronized fashion. The plan is transmitted to the Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) along with the plans developed by the subordinate units. The plans of subordinate units are integrated in the overall corps plan and are attached to provide the BCE the basis to work out Air Force support.

The completed plan, once submitted to the BCE is turned over to the current operations section to execute. If the corps CP is echeloned into a forward and a main, consideration should be given to handing off the execution of the plan to the forward CP. The air tasking order is received by the ASOC. The current operational and intelligence situation both on the FLOT and that which pertains to deep battle plan is monitored. A targeting cell in the FSE works with division targeting cells, the G2 Ops cell, the ASOC, and the BCE to divert BAI or CAS as necessary to support the current overall battle. G3 Ops and not the FSCoord must manage the overall effort. G3 Ops maps reflect the prosecution of the deep battle as well as the close in battle. The G3 Ops and G2 Ops update the BCE chief at least every three

hours to keep him current on the overall situation. The G2 Ops monitors the intelligence collection part of the plan. For instance, if a part of the overall plan called for the delay of a specific unit for a specific period of time then the EEI for the operation included whether this was in fact done. If this item of EEI was critical to a subsequent maneuver decision in the battle, then the effects of the deep attack on those units must be assessed and sensors tasked to find that information. The G2 Ops must anticipate receipt of that information and may need to aggressively seek it to insure that it gets processed and provided to him in a timely fashion.

The corps should strive for a flexible, responsive means for creating battlefield opportunities. To simply attrit the enemy in depth, based on a set of standing attack priorities, is not an effective use of resources. Such standing priorities should simply provide the background rationale to employ assets which are not needed to achieve a decisive concentration of effort for a specific purpose in support of the overall maneuver scheme. The best effect is achieved when all available means, not just Air Force and artillery, are coordinated and concentrated. For example, a Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) is closing on a division sector to reinforce the attack. The defending division needs time to defeat the now heavily attrited first echelon regiments and the newly committed second echelon regiments. The reinforcing division could rupture the defense if it arrives on the scene scheduled. To prevent this, it becomes imperative that this MRD be delayed at least 4-6 hours. To achieve this end the following technique could be employed:

The preplanning for the day envisaged that one of several divisions may need to be delayed along one of several approaches into the main battle area. Primary and alternate targets were planned for BAI, artillery, and attack helicopters working with Air Force aircraft in Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) configuration. Intelligence sensors have been tasked and channels cleared to receive information necessary for the finalization of plans. Plans are finalized and wings, batteries and attack helicopter units as well as sensors receive their final taskings, complete their plans and begin execution. BAI sorties are flown against predetermined choke points to halt the column and create congestion. This period of congestion and confusion is exploited two ways. The MRD traveling with radio silence now needs to use its radio nets to issue new instructions. The pre-planned EW effort stands ready to jam enemy attempts to sort out the problem. As this is occurring, an attack helicopter company working with several A-10s penetrates with the assistance of a Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) mission fired by the artillery. The JAAT takes advantage of gaps in the enemy's attack formations and untrafficable terrain to make their penetration. They work on the congested area either hampering and further degrading the effort to overcome the new obstacle or taking advantage of the enemy's vulnerability to destroy a sizable portion of his force. The JAAT breaks off and returns to base and further BAI and EW efforts may continue until assets are no longer available or the purpose has been achieved. If the attack is within artillery range, the delivery of scatterable mines could be used to initiate the operation and later inhibit by-pass operations.

Clearly the process needed to plan such an operation can be complex and beyond our immediate capabilities, but the engineering we do now in staff procedures and staff structure development must ultimately be able to plan and execute such joint operations. The process in being at GALLANT KNIGHT could not achieve such synchronization due primarily to organizations and procedures on the Army side. There are no limitations in procedures and organizations on the Air Force side which would now prohibit us from doing this if adequate OAS assets were apportioned to accomplish it.

RECOMMENDATION: That techniques of How to Fight the AirLand Battle be developed by CGSC.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: CGSC

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: Procedures for the deep battle are being developed by CGSC. They are being incorporated as an appendix in both FM 71-100 and 71-101. Additionally CGSC has developed an AirLand Battle exportable briefing that addresses the planning procedures and how-to-fight the deep battle.

The corps intelligence system was not capable of processing requests for information and responses to those requests in the time frames required for the conduct of effective second echelon attack.

DISCUSSION: The areas which promise the greatest payoff in future improvement of Joint Attack of Second Echelon (JSAK) procedures are in intelligence analysis, collection management, and information processing in general. While the current Army corps have access to space age technology for collection they still use Stone Age procedures for sorting, analyzing, storing, retrieving, prioritizing, managing and disseminating. Intelligence personnel are overwhelmed with the vast amount of administration required in the current system and have too little time to think. This results in vague requests for information, a misunderstanding of priorities, and a tendency to lose track of reality as intelligence personnel become caught in a mindless process. Time sensitive information needed for second echelon attack requires more streamlined procedures.

RECOMMENDATION: That TRADOC study intelligence flow needs within a corps staff to develop a more responsive system. Consideration should be given to the use of microcomputer technology to cut down the paper flow and to speed analysis and information transfer. Consideration should also be given to improving the training of intelligence officers in writing requests for information.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: CGSC in conjunction with CACDA and US Army Intelligence School.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: A number of tactical units have used training funds to purchase and field mini-computers to enhance collection management, improve the efficiency of intelligence analysis and expedite intelligence flow. Most notably, active application of microcomputer technology for these purposes is on-going at 9th Infantry Division, XVIII Airborne Corps and in USAREUR. Additionally, BDM is testing a Targeting Application Process (TAP) within V Corps with funding from Defense Nuclear Agency. Environmental, TEMPEST and training problems relative to microprocessors still exist and are being solved and lessons learned being passed among using units. This shared experience is being monitored by the MACOMs with FORSCOM probably being the most active as they have also instituted a centralized software training program. CACDA, USAICS and DCSOPS, DA have elected to place no controls on the field testing of micro-computers as they realize the training benefit of these field initiatives and while doing nothing to stifle them, cannot officially encourage their proliferation other than for training because of the on-going development of the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) (projected requirement date 1985) and its predecessor, the Technical Control and Analysis Center-Division (TCAC-D) (IUC to USAREUR January 83).

Funding has been approved and letter requirements/operations concepts prepared for field of slow-scan TV systems for all divisions which will expedite the flow of intelligence between staff section within the CP. V and VII Corps already use closed circuit TV for this purpose.

Instruction at CGSC and at USAICS is placing greater emphasis on specificity in requests for information and focusing on signatures/indicators of enemy intent rather than general EEI.

OBSERVATION: GK 82-3

Source: USACAC

The Army and Air Force officers at all levels and in all staff sections generally did not have the knowledge or experience required to make judgements about what the Air Force can and cannot do.

DISCUSSION: This resulted in improper requests and a lack of understanding between Army and Air Force officers throughout the system from division targeting cells through the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). Continued training and experience will make whatever process used in joint attack of the second echelon more effective. RDAFFOR units often placed impossible demands on the RDAFFOR or were not able to tap the full potential of support available. For instance, a request for a B-52 strike was pursued for nearly eight hours before a definitive answer was given. Meanwhile a different type of mission would have been more fruitful. On the other hand, insufficient information was passed to the TACC to permit effective planning to strike targets which would be moving during the planning cycle. Assets were not tasked to track moving targets. Not enough alternate targets were provided to allow effective diversion and thus effective use of scheduled BAI. Such BAI was often lost to Air Force targets, to lower priority targets or sometimes not flown at all.

RECOMMENDATION: That training on joint attack of the second echelon continue in joint exercises. TRADOC schools should focus more on Air Force operations-how air missions are planned and executed rather than just on the Air Ground Operations System and capabilities of items of hardware.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: CGSC.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: The Department of Command (DCOM) CGSC has commenced preparation of FM 100-26, AirLand Operations, to provide doctrine for the joint Army and Air Force process for planning, coordinating, and employing tactical air operations in support of ground forces. Preliminary draft is scheduled for publication in late 1982 and a coordinating draft in May 1983.

A new Individual Development Course (IDC) concerning Air Power is taught by the CGSC Air Force Section with emphasis on the tactical air control system and the C³ procedures required to effect AirLand Forces interface. Additionally, 20-40 students per year take part in the TAC-sponsored BLUE FLAG exercise at Hurlburt AFB which exercises the Air Ground Operations System (AGOS), the AirLand Forces Interface (ALFI) concept and the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (JSAK) process.

The number of hours devoted to Air Force subjects as part of tactics and staff operations instruction has increased. The Air Force instruction that is part of tactics subjects has been made more individualized by taking the class out of the auditorium and conducting it in the student classroom. Additional hours are still required for effective Air Force coverage of the required material. Current Air Force instruction as part of P318 AirLand

Battle, for example, addresses tactical air planning considerations of offensive air support (OAS), the apportionment/allocation process, limitations on the use of OAS, the use of close air support (CAS) by the ground commander, and the Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) in two brief hours.

An Air Force-taught elective concerning AGOS and ALFI on the AirLand Battlefield is presented to the Pre-Command Course (PCC). Consideration should be given to making this part of the PCC core curriculum as then all Army brigade and battalion commanders would receive the instruction.

Department of Tactics instructors have received professional development classes on OAS, tactical reconnaissance, and Soviet frontal aviation from the Air Force Section. This program is to be expanded and has been offered to other CGSC departments. It will be included in DCOM instructor training.

As a result of an advanced tactical research project by selected Air Force students this year, an increased level of more effective and realistic air play is being inserted in all CGSC tactical scenarios.

NOTE: The term OAS is presently under review by HQs TAC. It appears that the BAI portion of OAS will now be included in Air Interdiction (AI).

OBSERVATION: GK 82-4

Source: USACAC

The FIRST BATTLE/TACSIM simulation system used to drive the exercise does not enhance deep battle procedures training because it responds best to attrition and does not generate the delay which would accompany an effective second echelon attack.

DISCUSSION: RDARFOR staff personnel at all levels were quick to point to sources of problems resulting from the simulation procedure. The benefits of exercising the RDJTF using TACSIM and FIRST BATTLE were readily acknowledged; however, to properly exercise second echelon attack procedures several simulation needs must be met in future exercises.

The effects of BAI must be adequately portrayed. These effects include delay as well as cumulative attrition.

The interface between TACSIM and FIRST BATTLE must be improved to exercise intelligence collection and analysis skills. Too often command and control headquarters were separated from their component parts and not moved. Also the attacking forces never moved into assembly areas as they moved forward; they merely halted along the road. These events often caused player frustration and negativism.

Also, FIRST BATTLE has not been modified to permit playing the more maneuver oriented tactics. For example, a flanking counterattack or flanking fires are treated the same as a frontal attack by fire. Surprise, deception, etc. are impossible to achieve in this simulation.

RECOMMENDATION: That simulation procedures be reviewed to improve their ability to exercise joint attack of the second echelon for future exercises.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: TCATA in conjunction with CATRADA-BSD.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: TACSIM/FIRST BATTLE interface depiction of game board units was based upon guidance provided by USREDCOM. The basic scenario, attrition, and other factors influencing intelligence simulated during exercise play is directly governed by the exercise control organization.

FIRST BATTLE was modified in March 81 to include extended battle play. A delay model is included in this adjustment. More maneuver oriented tactics were included in the Field Observation Booklet, 22 June 79, which reflects the effect of tactics listed as being excluded.

OBSERVATION: GK 82-5

Source: USACAC

The joint procedures for attack of second echelon forces were generally those recommended by the JSAK study and seemed to work well.

DISCUSSION: The interface between the Army and the Air Force was generally that prescribed by the joint TAC-TRADOC Air Land Forces Interface (ALFI) study and the recent final draft of the JSAK study. There was a Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) at the Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) and an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) at the corps headquarters. There was a joint Army/Air Force target planning down to division level. This system of interface will work to accomplish the Army's aims.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Army expedite the final review of the JSAK study and model, and then press on to work out the details of Army peculiar doctrine on procedures and techniques necessary to fight the deep battle.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: HQ TRADOC

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: Distribution of the draft JSAK concept and procedures pamphlet was delayed pending TAC/CC and TRADOC CG approval of the JSAK concept. The TAC-TRADOC approved JSAK concept and draft JSAK procedures will be distributed upon concept approval for worldwide comment.

OBSERVATION: GK 82-6

Source: USACAC

The use of areas of influence and areas of interest was not well understood.

DISCUSSION: The XVIII Abn Corps could have been well served by the definitions which have now been incorporated in the emerging doctrine. The concept they used was based on TRADOC PAM 525-5. This concept does not provide for the top down delineation of areas of influence with a forward terminating line. As a result, no two maps had the same time lines which created conflicting areas of responsibility for the deep battle. In one case this problem was resolved when a captain in the 82d Abn Div targeting cell and a major in the corps targeting cell drew a line which in essence became the division's forward terminating line.

RECOMMENDATION: That new doctrinal guidance be published ASAP.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: CGSC.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: The areas of interest and influence have been clearly defined and are discussed in FM 100-5 (Final Draft) and FM's 100-15 and 71-100 (Coordinating Drafts).

OBSERVATION: GK 82-7

Source: USACAC

Corps staffs are so large and cumbersome that they may not be able to react to modern battlefield situations as rapidly as they should.

DISCUSSION: There are so many people in a corps headquarters that the normal staff information flow which occurs in a smaller division command post is dissipated and staff elements find themselves working in isolation and many layers removed from the source of command guidance. This produces a remoteness and a lessened sense of urgency.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That TRADOC conduct an intense study on how to reduce the size of these headquarters.

That new deep battle functions not be allowed to increase the size of headquarters.

That the use of microcomputers be examined for application in streamlining staff procedures and reducing the overall size of the staff.

PROPOSAL FOR ACTION: CACDA.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: Previous work/efforts to reduce the size of corps headquarters have, for the most part, resulted in only fractional decreases with a disproportionate loss in effectiveness. The indications are that modern C² requires most of the personnel and equipment dedicated to it. Though automation offers personnel economies in some areas (information receipt, storage, retrieval and display), these savings tend to be off-set by the increase in maintenance and ADP equipment support personnel. While further reductions may be possible through a change in operational concepts, this area is not within the primary responsibility of C³I. Recommend that CDD take the lead, and working in conjunction with C³I, develop the operational concepts which may provide a reduction in corps CP size.

CACDA does believe that automation offers large potential advantages in streamlining the corps operation.

The current CACDA C³I program involves III, V, VII and XVIII Corps. The thrust of the program is to automate the staff functions and associated information handling procedures. The program consists of the following steps:

1. Develop test beds in each corps using off-the-shelf technology.
2. Develop through an interactive and evolutionary program the system requirements in terms of both generic hardware and software.

3. Incorporate system requirements into DARCOM program and initiate new starts where appropriate.

4. Develop O&O concepts to facilitate integration of support requirements for the new system in terms of personnel, logistics, training and system integration.

The program is currently in steps 1 and 2. Progress into step 3 should begin after REFORGER 82.

OBSERVATION: GK 82-3

Source: USACAC

The success or failure of division second echelon attack depends greatly on corps procedures.

DISCUSSION: Corps is the focal point of all deep battle planning and execution. However, the large size of the corps staff tends to make the decisionmaking process compartmented, which creates the potential for conflicting guidance to the divisions. The net result would be an uncoordinated deep attack.

RECOMMENDATION: That priority be given to develop corps level deep battle procedures, targeting cell requirements, etc., ahead of division level procedures.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: CGSC.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: CGSC is developing deep battle procedures for corps and division. Corps is the focal point for much of the deep battle planning and execution which requires joint procedures. Many of these joint procedures are being developed in a TAC/TRADOC Joint Action Steering Committee called JSAC. As these procedures are refined they will be incorporated into the Corps and Division manuals and the deep battle planning and execution.

OBSERVATION: GK 82-9

Source: USACAC

The XVIII Abn Corps demonstrated the impressive capability of microcomputer technology to assist in staff functions.

DISCUSSION: The advantage of these computers is that information can be transmitted by digital burst through our anticipated communications system. Each terminal has a storage capability and can pass information to another terminal. Not only can such a system be useful in keeping a commander updated but guidance also can be passed to all staff sections. Staff coordination can also be speeded. Each working element of the staff could tap into the same information. Care must be taken to format the information so that not more than what is needed, is passed between terminals. This system can also be used to pass operations orders and plans to subordinate units and to render reports to higher headquarters. This system portends a quantum leap in combat capability if it results in faster and more informed decisionmaking. But at the same time it must not exacerbate a tendency to micro-manage. This may be the key to the "synchronization" and "agility" the new doctrine addresses, provided we don't interfere with the "initiative" it also stresses.

RECOMMENDATION: That TRADOC evaluate XVIII Abn Corps' pioneer use of microcomputers with the goal of developing an automated corps CP.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: HQ TRADOC and CACDA.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: CACDA C3I is incorporating products of the XVIII Abn Corps initiative into an overall program plan aimed at automating staff functions and information distribution system from corps thru squad level. A draft CEP Resume Sheet has been developed and is currently being staffed which will initiate this effort.

Off-the-shelf microprocessors augment Army efforts such as the SIGMA program and Military Computer Family (MCF) and are being incorporated into the design of a system which will expedite and streamline the decision making process.

Reference: Observation GK 82-7.

OBSERVATION: GK 82-10

Source: USACAC

US Army doctrine and the education of US Army officers is scant on the use of defensive smoke in the rear areas to protect critical chokepoints, key facilities, ports, and airfields from air attack.

DISCUSSION: During the exercise it was noted that in many cases it would have been advantageous to be able to blanket key rear areas with smoke for extended periods of time to protect them from enemy air. The US Army used smoke generator units extensively in World War II, most notably at Anzio. Such a capability today would appreciably help in solving our rear area protection problem. Many vulnerable rear area facilities, and also decoy locations, could be smoked to make the enemy's targeting more difficult.

RECOMMENDATION: That a section on the use of smoke and smoke generators be included in the base defense chapter of FM 90-14, Rear Area Protection, and that CACDA examine the upgrading of our smoke capability.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: CGSC.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: Defensive smoke will be discussed in detail in FM 90-14 with particular emphasis placed on how it can be used to mask key installations and facilities as addressed above.

OBSERVATION: GK 82-11

Source: USAICS

EW assets were not effectively integrated into tactical maneuver plans.

DISCUSSION: EW assets must be considered as a combat force and as such be integrated into offensive and defensive plans. SC 37A and Combat Arms Officers must be trained in EW tactics and their employment on the battlefield as a combat force multiplier.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That EW "How to Fight" doctrine and a "How to Fight" manual be developed.

That the concept of EW as a combat force multiplier be incorporated in combat arms Basic and Advanced Officer Courses.

That 37A officers be taught EW tactics.

PROPENSITY FOR ACTION: US Army Intelligence School.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: EW "How to Fight" Doctrine and Manual are currently being developed. The manual (FM 34-1) is in coordination draft, Oct 82.

In Oct 80, the then EW office, Directorate of Training Developments, USAICS, was directed via back channel MSG from LTC Richardson, Dep Cdr, TRADOC to standardize EW training throughout TRADOC schools. The EW office wrote the following lesson plans:

Introduction to EW

Threat/Radio Electronic Combat (REC)

Defensive EW

Electronic Counter Counter Measures (ECCM)

The lesson plans included narratives, slides, ETV and was nine hours in length. Sixteen copies were sent to all TRADOC around Apr 81. This nine hour course was an interim action. A two week course is being developed and should be available third quarter, FY 83.

SC 37A officers are currently being taught limited EW tactics. This instruction is limited due to a lack of approved doctrine. This situation should be rectified when FM 34-1 is approved and fielded. The Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) branch will conduct a Task Selection Board which will determine what 37A and 37B officers will be taught based on a world wide survey conducted by that office. The need for teaching 37As EW tactics will be reviewed by the board and related training will be incorporated in a revised SC 37A course which will begin in May 1984.

OBSERVATION: GK 82-12

Source: USAICS

The term "Direct Support" appears to be inappropriate with regard to employment of the collection and jamming platoons.

DISCUSSION: FM 34-10, Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) (DIV), dated 3 July 81 states: "It is normal to place the C&S platoon and IEW support elements in direct support of the brigade" The problem stems from the classical definition of DS as it applies to employment of artillery, engineers, etc. This definition is accurate when EW assets are deployed in support of a brigade operating separately; however, it does not hold true when the brigade deploys as part of a division force. The brigade commander has no direct control over the EW operations in his area. He must relate his EW mission requirement to the EW LNO who passes it to the division support element who then tasks the platoon.

RECOMMENDATION: That a review of the classical definition of "DS" be conducted to insure that it is applicable to emerging doctrine associated with EW in the AirLand Battle.

PROPOSAL FOR ACTION: US Army Intelligence School.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: MI Support to the AirLand Battle will be covered doctrinally in great detail in the publication FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. FM 34-10, Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) (DIV), Chap 2, pg 2-10 depicts the Direct Support Chain. Currently in production for publication and fielding is the Final Approved Draft of FM 34-12, Collection and Jamming Company Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) (DIV), Chap 2, which covers in detail the Direct Support relationships of the C & J platoons and company.

OBSERVATION: GK 82-13

Source: USAMMCS

US Army ammunition units which receive deployed toxic munitions do not possess the capability to detect, decontaminate and seal possible chemical leakage within an Ammo Supply Point.

DISCUSSION: Army conventional ammunition companies do not receive training and are not equipped to detect chemical leakage and to decontaminate, seal and repackage defective toxic munitions. With the advent of binary chemical munitions, this deficiency will not exist. In the short term, however, a special type chemical handling augmentation team should be deployed with toxic chemical stocks thus providing the specific services required.

RECOMMENDATION: That HQ TRADOC analyze the above proposal and, if accepted, develop the training and unit support package.

PROPNENCY FOR ACTION: US Army Chemical School in conjunction with HQ TRADOC.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: Army ammunition units which receive deployed toxic munitions have ammunition specialists, 55B, assigned to them. This soldier's duties, as described by AR 611-201 w/Change 17, require the performance of detection and decontamination procedures involving chemical agents; therefore, the capability does exist to provide detection and decontamination services.

HQ, TRADOC is currently considering a proposal submitted by USAMMCS to organize a special type chemical handling augmentation team which would be deployed with toxic chemical stocks. This team would augment the conventional ammunition company and should be manned with 55B MOS personnel rather than MOS 54E, since they are required to detect and decontaminate chemical agents.

Since USAMMCS trains the ammunition specialist, 55B, and has submitted the proposal for a special type chemical handling augmentation team, recommend that the proponency be changed from USACMLS to USAMMCS in conjunction with HQ TRADOC and USACMLS.

Doctrine requires the Petroleum Operating Battalion and Company to be able to operate high pressure commercial multiproduct pipelines.

DISCUSSION: Currently, battalion and company only operate and train on low pressure pipelines. Operation of a high pressure pipeline is a highly technical skill requiring a cumulative depth of experience reinforced with adequate sustainment training. Only those individuals who have been assigned to the petroleum unit in Okinawa or Korea possess the required expertise to operate high pressure pipelines.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the Quartermaster School review existing POI to incorporate the operation of high pressure commercial multiproduct pipelines into their curriculum.

That portable training packages be provided on the operation of high pressure pipelines to petroleum operating units.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: US Army Quartermaster School.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: The above observation states that doctrine requires the Petroleum Operating Battalion and Company to be able to operate high pressure commercial multiproduct pipelines. However, the only high pressure multiproduct pipeline operated by the US Army is the Trans-Korea Pipeline (TKP). This system employs civilian type turbine pumps and is operated by Petroleum Distribution System, Korea (PDSK). All current training concepts (up to 1990) are based on the split ringed groove coupling system for low pressure pipelines.

Presently, the Quartermaster School teaches low pressure pipeline operations in the Petroleum Specialist NCO Advanced Course (23 1/2 percent of the course). There are no basic differences in the operation of the high pressure pipeline and the low pressure pipelines; therefore, adequate training is available for pipeline operations.

Export training that covers pipelines (Army Correspondence Course Program - ACCP) is already available. Additional subcourses are currently under development.

Pipeline operations in both Korea and Okinawa are essentially the same, with the difference being in models of civilian pumps used. The QM School, could not possibly teach all of the different commercial pumps in use today.

SECTION III

EXERCISE SUMMARY

JRX GALLANT EAGLE 82

30 MARCH - 6 APRIL 1982

1. General: Exercise GALLANT EAGLE 82 was a Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinated field training exercise (FTX) and command post exercise (CPX) sponsored by USREDCOM. The exercise was conducted in two phases:

a. Phase I (30-31 March 82): Tactical Deployment Phase. This phase was not part of the exercise scenario. Airborne airdrop/airland operations occurred at Ft Irwin, CA.

b. Phase II (1-6 April 82): The FTX/CPX included live ARFOR, AFFOR, and MARFOR forces at Ft Irwin and Twenty-nine Palms, CA, as well as full CPX play at the major headquarters.

2. Purpose: Exercise the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and its components, as well as the deployment community.

3. Evaluation Areas: Within the framework of the exercise, TRADOC SMEs conducted a formal doctrinal evaluation of the following areas:

a. Command and Control, specifically focusing on an examination of: the command relationships both internal and external to the RDJTF, the tactical air control/air defense interface with all service component commands, the interface of joint tactical C³ systems, and the use of protective measures against radio electronic combat (REC) during joint operations.

b. Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD), specifically focusing on the J-SEAD campaign and localized J-SEAD operations.

c. Joint Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance, specifically examining the coordinated joint reconnaissance effort.

d. Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE), specifically focusing on the techniques and procedures associated with the BCE.

e. Communications, specifically focusing on the RDJTF communications support concept.

f. Sustainability, specifically examining the validity of the RDJTF logistic concept and supporting plans.

4. TRADOC SME SUPPORT FOR JRX GALLANT EAGLE 82

USA CACDA

MAJ(P) Donald L. Mercer

Threat Controller

USA CATRADA

LTC Howard Murray

WAR EAGLE/FIRST BATTLE Instructor

MAJ(P) Ronald E. Osimo

Operations/Plans Evaluator
(C² TEAM)

MAJ James W. Allman

WAR EAGLE/FIRST BATTLE Instructor

MAJ Cliff W. Reed

TRADOC Program Manager

MAJ John McCutcheon

WAR EAGLE/FIRST BATTLE Instructor

CPT(P) Mark G. Spitler

Operations/Plans Evaluator
(C² TEAM)

SFC Timothy A. Hale

WAR EAGLE/FIRST BATTLE Instructor

USA Field Artillery School

MAJ Robert W. Zawilski

Team Chief, J-SEAD
Evaluation Team (J-SEAD TEAM)

CPT Clement W. Rittenhouse

DIV/BDE J-SEAD
Evaluator (J-SEAD TEAM)

USA Chemical School

LTC Gunter H. Neubert

Chemical Evaluator
(C² TEAM)

USA Intelligence School - Ft Huachuca, AZ

CPT Darryl F. Eberhart

Intelligence Evaluator
(RECCE/SURV TEAM)

CPT Raymond L. Gonia

Electronic Warfare Evaluator
(C² TEAM)

CPT Joan Hodowanitz

Electronic Warfare Evaluator
(C² TEAM)

1LT David K. Fukuda

Division Intelligence Evaluator
(RECCE/SURV TEAM)

2LT Gary M. Bateman

Electronic Warfare Evaluator
(C² TEAM)

USA Intelligence School - Ft Devens, MA

CPT James M. Browne

Reconnaissance Evaluator
(RECCE/SURV TEAM)

CPT Lesley Orband

CEWI Bn Controller

CPT Susan J. Werner

Electronic Warfare Evaluator
(C² TEAM)

USA Signal School

MAJ Neil Weems

Communications Evaluator
(Commo Team)

CPT Janet E. Hicks

Communications Evaluator
(Commo Team)

USA Transportation School

LTC Peter B. Everitt

Operations/Plans Logistics
Evaluator (C² TEAM)

TAC-TRADOC ALPHA

COL Robert Hardiman

Team Chief, Battle Coordination
Element (BCE)

COL Thomas B. Barnes

Asst Team Chief, BCE

LTC Bruce J. Gold

Operations Evaluator (BCE TEAM)

LTC Edward H. Robertson

Plans Evaluator (BCE TEAM)

LTC Allen J. Whitcomb

Plans Evaluator (BCE TEAM)

MAJ John S. Waller

Plans Evaluator (BCE TEAM)

FOLLOW-UP STATUS OF TRADOC OBSERVATIONS

JRX GALLANT EAGLE 82

OBSERVATION: GE 82-1

Source: USAICS

Army personnel frequently failed to initiate and/or react to Meaconing Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference (MIJI) Reports during the CPX and FTX phases of GALLANT EAGLE 82.

DISCUSSION: Operators, as well as personnel with C³CM/EW responsibilities, demonstrated a lack of understanding of the purpose of MIJI Reports. Most thought that the MIJI Report was "historical" in nature and that it served no useful function. Operators tended to explain their inability to communicate as "equipment failure" without actually testing the equipment for malfunctions. They did not understand that the MIJI Report is a vehicle by which the commander can take defensive or offensive action against enemy radio electronic combat (REC) activities. In those cases where MIJI Reports were written and submitted, action officers (S3/G3/CE) frequently failed to react to them. Many reports were filed and ignored.

RECOMMENDATION: That TRADOC Service Schools continue to stress MIJI reporting at all service centers and schools. This training should focus on actions taken by commanders based on the MIJI reports.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: CTI, CATRADA.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: Most service schools have a block of instruction covering MIJI reporting, especially in their OBC, OAC and radio operator courses. However, the instruction usually will not exceed an hour at the most. Due to the number of other more critical tasks and subjects that must be covered in a relatively short period of time, this is the best that can be accomplished at the service schools.

To correct this problem fully, units must periodically conduct reinforcement training at the operator and commander level on MIJI reporting including purpose and procedures for that unit. This should be accomplished especially just prior to a CPX/FTX.

The Corps (CTOC Main) successfully focused its Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) collection effort against a prioritized list of high value enemy targets for CPX play. However, the IEW system needs to be more fully integrated into the entire target development cycle to include post strike analysis.

DISCUSSION: The target development cycle began with the commander providing guidance to his staff (e.g., enemy units of interest in the second echelon). The G2 and G3 developed a prioritized list of targets. As the G3 refined the concept of the operation, he also developed collection requirements (e.g., where are the command posts of the second echelon units? Where will they be in X hours?, etc) for the G2's IEW assets. The G2 then oriented his Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process by matching the prioritized threat units to specific supporting systems (radios, radars, weapon systems, vehicles, etc.). For example, a divisional command post would generate a recognizable electromagnetic profile due to its electronic emitters in its Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C³I) systems. The Corps then performed terrain and map analysis to determine probable CP sites. As a result of this directed IPB effort, the G2 was successful in focusing limited collection assets over an extended battlefield and against a plethora of potential targets. By focusing the IEW system, the Corps greatly reduced the tendency to look for the enemy in the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong sensor. However, the G2 needs to refine post strike analysis of targets that have been attacked by tasking appropriate sensor systems (photo, SIGINT, etc.) for immediate feedback to the G3 targeteers. Without bomb damage assessment (BDA) data, the targeteers cannot effectively begin the targeting cycle again.

RECOMMENDATION: That CGSC review XVIII Abn Corps target development procedures in an effort to refine, develop, and streamline post strike analysis to support the targeting cycle and publish doctrinal guidance.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: CGSC in conjunction with XVIII Abn Corps.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: Department of Command, CGSC, reviewed XVIII Abn Corps target cycle techniques to include post strike analysis in action during LOGEX 82. The collection and management of post strike analysis in a timely manner is essential for the continuous functioning of the targeting cycle. XVIII Abn Corps places emphasis on independent verification of target strikes from in-flight reports, sensors, Air Force "RECCE", and other available means. DCOM has incorporated these important aspects of the targeting cycle into Course P115/3, "Corps Staff Operations" at CGSC. Additionally, FM 100-15 (DRAFT), will portray these essential aspects of the targeting cycle.

OBSERVATION: GE 82-3

Source: USAICS

The Corps had difficulty meeting operational requirements due to the personnel authorization in their current TOE.

DISCUSSION: The OIC of the Technical Control and Analysis Center (TCAC) and Chief of the All-Source Intelligence Center (ASIC) recommended the following personnel changes to the Corps TOE:

a. TCAC: Junior personnel are being assigned from the schools without sufficient knowledge to perform their duties. This imposes too great a hardship on the gaining units to train them on basic skills and operate the TCAC in an effective manner especially when understrength.

(1) Corps had insufficient 98Js (Non-Communications Operators/Analysts) to operate systems on hand.

(2) Due to a shortage of 98Cs (Traffic Analysts), 98Gs (Linguists) must be cross-trained to meet requirements.

b. ASIC:

(1) Requires at least one Imagery Intelligence Warrant Officer and four enlisted Imagery Interpreters (96D) for terrain analysis and target refinement.

(2) Does not require a Traffic Analysis Technician (982A) since the TCAC collocates with the ASIC in the field. Two 98Cs (Traffic Analysts) and two 98Js (Non-Communications Analysts - skill level three) are sufficient to interpret data within the ASIC (one per shift).

(3) As the TOE now stands, there are at least eight 964As (Order of Battle Technicians) and ten 96Bs (Order of Battle Specialists) authorized. This results in approximately one "Indian" per "Chief." The number of warrant officers should be reduced.

RECOMMENDATION: That the current and proposed TOEs for the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) and TCAC be reviewed and revised as appropriate.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: USAICS.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: As a result of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS), intelligence assets and capabilities were consolidated under a single intelligence commander and placed in support of corps and divisions. These units were designated as CEWI. From this amalgamation, CEWI tactical doctrine developed and includes, among many other things, separation of the tactical operations center and the technical control and analysis center functions.

Capabilities which existed under the old "MI" and "ASA" TOEs were melded into the current organizational structure. Basic methods of operation remain essentially the same, except that now the effort is integrated. Because equipment or personnel MOS shortages exist, field expedient measures should not be allowed to dictate doctrine or confound conceptual goals. Care should be taken to insure that new doctrine does not evolve by default.

The assignment of junior officer personnel cannot be solved by TOE action. Schools can only train them for the skill levels required at their grade and level of experience. The TOE provides adequate manning for systems such as ITEP. Shortage of critical skills, (98J, 98C and 98G MOS) is a resource problem.

Target refinement is to be accomplished by the terrain analysis team assigned to the CTOC support element. Also there are other assigned personnel to assist, such as: Two officers and two senior enlisted in the Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D), one officer and two senior enlisted in the OPSEC, and nine 96D personnel in the G3 section.

The number of 982's in the TCAC are provided so that the group S3 can run operations. None of the operational functions are transferable to the CTOC whether allocated or not.

The ten 984 Order of Battle warrant spaces were authorized on the basis of one per shift (2) per five teams. Current authorization is a constraint by DA, which allows for support to only two Div's and two ACR's or separate Bde. The jobs were graded based upon skill level requirements, not supervisory talent.

OBSERVATION: GE 82-4

Source: USAICS

Career Management Field (CMF) 98 (EW/Cryptologic) enlisted personnel are graduating from Advanced Individual Training (AIT) without the skills required to perform critical, skill level one tasks.

DISCUSSION: The training provided to CMF 98 is so minimal that unqualified personnel are being sent to tactical units. The amount of on-the-job training (OJT) required to bring such personnel to an acceptable level of proficiency far exceeds the amount of time and trainers available in most tactical units. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many CONUS tactical units do not have the mission equipment and/or an ongoing mission requiring certain MOSs in CMF 98. For example, a tactical unit which has no direction finding equipment cannot adequately maintain the skills of 050s (Direction Finders). Participation in Live Environment Training (LET), REDTRAIN programs, and training exercises does help. However, these personnel report to their units with such a rudimentary knowledge in their MOS that they require intensive and sustained training to learn the skills that should have been taught in AIT that would allow them to perform their duties in the gaining command.

RECOMMENDATION: That HQ TRADOC review the Programs of Instruction (POIs) for CMF 98 to ensure that personnel are trained to perform critical, skill level one tasks in tactical units. If necessary, a front end analysis of those tasks should be conducted to ensure that TRADOC meets tactical unit requirements. In addition, recommend that HQ TRADOC coordinate with the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to accelerate the development of the appropriate training support package for CMF 98 personnel assigned to tactical units.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: DCST, TRADOC in conjunction with INSCOM and USAICS.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: A review of the POI indicates that adequate training is being provided.

OBSERVATION: GE 82-5

Source: USAICS

Pre-exercise GUARDRAIL (Airborne HF/UHF/VHF Intercept and Location System) tactical reports were received at RDARFOR in abnormally large quantities.

DISCUSSION: The 525th Combat Electronics Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) Group, RDARFOR, received message traffic from the tactical simulator (TACSIM) which reflected an excessive quantity of tactical reports (TACREP) for a single GUARDRAIL mission. Approximately 100 TACREPS were received during the time period of a single mission, whereas previous live flight collection had never equaled this figure. It was determined that TACSIM had not produced an excessive quantity of reports, but the communication delays created a backlog of TACREPS from several missions. This was not detected by consumers because mission numbers were not assigned. TACSIM representatives immediately initiated manual action to ensure that each GUARDRAIL mission was assigned a mission number which was reflected on each TACREP.

RECOMMENDATION: That TACSIM be modified to reflect mission numbers.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: TCATA.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: During GALLANT EAGLE 82, TACSIM produced non-codeword TACREP's in accordance with NSA directives in a format that was reviewed and approved by NSA representatives prior to the exercise. The approved format does not provide for mission numbers. If such information is required by analytical personnel, recommend that appropriate NSA representatives to USREDCOM be so notified.

OBSERVATION: GE 82-6

Source: USACMLS

Doctrine in Army manuals was outdated, incomplete, and did not address current chemical offensive and defensive issues.

DISCUSSION: Both NBC defensive and offensive manuals were several years old. In some cases, doctrinal concepts in these manuals have been overcome by events (e.g., several of the weapon systems in FM 3-10B are no longer in the inventory).

RECOMMENDATION: That TRADOC expedite the revision of the appropriate manuals to update concepts and reflect current Army capabilities.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: USACMLS.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: The following is the revised schedule for doctrinal manuals to TAG Center:

- a. FM 3-100 (Test), NBC Operations, 1st Quarter FY 83.
- b. FM 3-100, NBC Operations, 1st Quarter FY 84 will replace FM 21-40 (Oct 77) and FM 3-100 (Test).
- c. FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, 3rd Quarter FY 83 will replace TM 3-220 (Nov 77).
- d. FM 3-87, NBC Reconnaissance and Decontamination Operations (Feb 80), 4th Quarter FY 83.
- e. FM 3-50-1 (Test), Smoke Operations, 1st Quarter FY 83.
- f. FM 3-50 (Apr 67), Smoke Operations, 4th Quarter FY 83 will replace FM 3-50-1 (Test).
- g. FM 3-4, Collective Protection, 3rd Quarter FY 84, and will replace TM 3-221 (Nov 66).
- h. FM 3-10-1, Employment of Chemical Agents, 3rd Quarter FY 83 will replace FM 3-10 (Mar 66).
- i. FM 3-10-2 (C), Chemical Effects Data, 3rd Quarter FY 83 will replace FM 3-10B (Nov 66).
- j. FM 3-10-3, Field Behavior of Chemical Agents, 1st Quarter FY 83 will replace TM 3-240 (Apr 69).

OBSERVATION: GE 82-7

Source: USASIGS

Communications Center Specialists (72E) are not adequately trained in the Signal School to enable them to operate efficiently upon unit assignment.

DISCUSSION: The Program of Instruction for the 72E Course at Fort Gordon, Georgia, is designed to only familiarize the student with Communication Center procedures. It is primarily a self-paced course with not enough emphasis on the level of qualifications of the graduate. The gaining unit is not staffed to conduct a full 72E training course to the point where the operator is proficient. Average training time to accomplish this in a unit is three months.

RECOMMENDATION: That TRADOC examine the existing POI for the 72E Course to determine if the level of instruction is meeting proficiency criteria for graduates.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: DCST, TRADOC.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: The 72E resident course has been reviewed and it is the opinion of USASIGC that soldiers are trained as apprentices when graduated. It must be understood that the gaining unit must provide additional, supervised on the job training (SOJT) and continued job practice to achieve the Journeyman (Soldier's Manual) level of performance. This level of performance should be achieved in three months and is presently being met by the units.

OBSERVATION: GE 82-8

Source: USASIGS

There are no UHF radios authorized within the ADA TOE to interface with AWACS for voice and data communications in the event the Control and Reporting Center (CRC) becomes inoperative.

DISCUSSION: ADA has recognized the need for voice and data communications with AWACS aircraft. The ADA Brigade and HAWK Battalion Headquarters must be able to pass voice and data traffic to extend their advanced air warning network. During GALLANT EAGLE 82, the improvised communication data link to the AWACS was never operational and only sporadic voice communication was established. A MTOE change has been submitted by the 11th ADA Bde to overcome the AWACS communication problem.

RECOMMENDATION: That the ADA Bde and HAWK Battalion TOE be revised to include additional communications equipment that interfaces with AWACS.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: CACDA.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: ADA (Bde & Hawk Bn) TOE's are being modified to add improved HF Radios (193's) for voice only to both the CRC and alternatively the E3A. Additionally, for selected (RDJTF) Hawk Bn & GP's the ANTSC106 JTIDS ASIT is being added. The ANTSC106 is a JTIDS radio and translator for E-3A data links. In a worst case scenario, should the translator become inoperative, the radio could be used for voice links to the E-3A if the E-3A would accept voice on a D/L primary radio.

OBSERVATION: GE 82-9

Source: USACAC

Jointly developed Air Land Forces Interface (ALFI) and Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (JSAK) concept and procedure manuals were not available to exercise participants.

DISCUSSION: The ALFI and JSAK manuals being developed by TRADOC should be finalized and approved expeditiously. Air Force and Army field units, training centers, and schools require these products in jointly approved procedures for executing AirLand Battle doctrine.

RECOMMENDATION: That a high priority be given to publication of the ALFI and JSAK manuals.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: HQ TRADOC.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: Distribution of the draft JSAK concept and procedures pamphlet was delayed pending TAC/CC and TRADOC CG approval of the JSAK concept. The TAC-TRADOC approved JSAK concept and draft JSAK procedures will be distributed upon concept approval for worldwide comment.

A JSAK briefing is being prepared. When approved, the briefing will be given to various headquarters, designated by the TAC-TRADOC Joint Actions Steering Committee (JASC), as a means of obtaining input for refinement of the JSAK.

Coordination and revision of the AirLand Force Interface (ALFI) document continues. Revision to chapter 1 was made on 11 Jun 82. Distribution is being delayed pending TAC/CC and TRADOC CG approval.

OBSERVATION: GE 82-10

Source: USACAC

Synchronization of efforts to achieve a common joint objective was impeded by a lack of common terminology.

DISCUSSION: A common perception of the goals, intent, and capabilities of the joint force is essential for the staff employing the force. In a joint force, achieving the common perception is exacerbated by differences in terminologies and views of how the battle should be fought. Doctrine should provide a common, standardized language among staff to attain a common perception. For example, enemy air defense suppression is called "flak suppression" by the USMC, and USAF battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and air interdiction (AI) are called "deep air support" by the USMC.

RECOMMENDATION: That a common doctrine for joint battle with standardized terminology be developed and promulgated for use by the services worldwide.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: HQ TRADOC.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: USREDCOM has proposed to publish a Dictionary of Joint Terms that are not presently published in JCS Publication 1. The proposed document is currently being reviewed throughout the TRADOC community.

A consolidated TRADOC response will be forwarded to USREDCOM. The finalized version of the document should be published by USREDCOM in 1983.

OBSERVATION: GE 82-11

Source: USACAC

The Battle Control Element (BCE) does not have an approved table of organization and equipment (TOE).

DISCUSSION: The AirLand Forces Interface (ALFI) document provides the organizational and operational concept for the BCE. To date, this concept has been utilized in several CONUS JRxs; however, the BCE supported only one Army corps in each of them. The BCE concept has been accepted as a necessity in proper execution of the AirLand Battle and now needs to be codified by an authorization document.

RECOMMENDATION: That a table of organization and equipment be established for the BCE.

PROPONENCY FOR ACTION: HQ TRADOC.

FOLLOW-UP STATUS: A draft plan TOE 51-002J3, Army Liaison Detachment, Battlefield Coordination Tactical Air Control Center has been developed. The DPTOE has been sent to the field for final coordination.

The DPTOE is based on the AirLand Forces Interface (ALFI) document as changed on 11 Jun 82. The final approved version of the TOE should be ready for implementation in early 1983.

83-1093-CACDA-650-10 Dec 82

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